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Computer security professionals and researchers do not have a history of sharing and analyzing computer
vulnerability information. Scientists and engineers from older or more established fields have long understood
that publicizing, analyzing, and learning from other people's mistakes is essential to the stepwise refinement
of complex systems. Computer scientists, however, have not followed suit. Programmers reinvent classical
programming mistakcs, contributing to the reappearance of known vulnerabilities.
In the recent past, complltcr systems have come to be a part of critical systems that have a direct effect
on the safety and well-being of human beings and hence we must have lower tolerance for software failures.
In the dissedation I will attempt to show that computer vulnerability information presents important
regularities and these can be detected, and possibly visualized, providing important insight about the reason
of their prevalence and existence. The information derived from these observations could be used to improve on
all phases of the development of software systems, as could be in the design, development, debugging, testing
and maintenance of complex computer systems that must implement a set of policies defined by security
analysis.
A significant portion of the work that must be performed will concentrate on the development of clilSSifi-
cations and taxonomies that will permit the visualization and analysis of computer vulnerability information.
I hope that these classifications and taxonomies applied to a collection of vulnerabilities will provide a set
of features whose analysis will show that there arc clear statistical clustering:; and patterns caused because
developers and programmers are not learning from each others mistakes. Tlti.s analysis may be performed by
applying statistical analysis and knowledge discovery tools.
1 Introduction
Computer vulnerability analysis, or the process of collecting vulnerability information, classifying this information,
storing it in some consistent and logical format, and processing it using analysis tools, is not a well understood
process. In spite of the fact that software developers have been repairing vulnerabilities in their products for
many years, only a few researchers are beginning to understand that vulnerability analysis is an essential process
in the step-wise refinement of software products.
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Traditional sciences and engineering have a long history in the analysis of vulnerabilities of complex systems
[Per84, Sch94, And94, Pet85, LS9Z]. For example, the aerospace industry has a long record of recovering vulner-
ability information from incidents, storing this information and finding regularities or patterns and incorporating
their findings into production systems, making each subsequent product safer than the preceding one. Making
sense of apparent chaos by finding regularities is an essential characteristic of human beings. The Austrian-born
British philosopher of natural and social science Karl Popper even argues that "we arC! born with expectations...
one of the most important of these expectations is the expectation of finding a regularity. It is connected with
an inborn propensity to lookout for regularities, or with a need to find regularities..." [Pop69]
There are a few instances of researchers who have indeed attempted to find such regularities in computer
vulnerabilities, including the vulnerability analysis project at the University of California at Davis [BD96] and
the vulnerability classification efforts by Matt Bishop at the University of California at Davis [Bis95], both of
which are used to develop generic vulnerability detedion mechanisms; the intrusion detedion work done by Kumar
et a1. at the COAST laboratory, that concludes that vulnerabilities can be grouped together in generic classes
described by patterns [KS94, KS95b, Kum95, KS95a, CDE+96]; and the vulnerability classification work done
by Aslam and Krsul that provides a taxonomy of security faults [AsI95, AKS96a]; Ross Anderson collected and
analyzed vulnerability information for automatic teller machine (ATM) cryptosystems [And94] and concluded
that designers of automatic teller machines (ATM) cryptosystems failed to understand the real threat model
because vulnerability information is not collected, published and analyzed.
We see the same vulnerabilities appear again and again (for example a sendmail bug, a finger bug, a syslog
bug, and a Netscape bug all share the buffer overrun problem). This should be a powerful incentive for the
development of a freely available vulnerability database that could be used to learn from other people's mistakes.
Many articles in the literature make similar arguments for the need of publicly available data colledions and
analysis tools [And94, Asl95, AKS96a, Pol]: computer programmers are not learning from their mistakes and we
do not have tools that allow us to understand why this is the case.
The last few years have seen a surge in interest for the design and maintenance of vulnerability databases.
These are closely guarded commodities that are typically oriented towards the storage of vulnerability related
information, with system administrators that are capable of interpreting them in mind. These databases are not
being widely published and analyzed.
Groups in industry that market intrusion detection systems require vulnerability information for the generation
of their misuse signatures or intrusion patterns and benefit from proprietary databases because it gives them
a competitive advantage. In many cases, industry, government, and academia resist the publication of these
databases for fear that it would make them liable if hacker groups use this information to break into other systems.
Intelligence agencies may not reveal vulnerability information because they may be using these against systems
as part of their information warfare efforts. Finally, some systems administrators in academia, government, and
industry fear that public availability of vulnerability information may trigger a greater number of intrusions or
intrusion attempts by students or employees that otherwise would not be able to obtain vulnerability information.
2 Definition of Vulnerability
In the development of my dissertation, and all throught this document I will write about the development of
vulnerability classifications and the analysis of computer vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, there is widespread
disagreement on the precise definition of the term "computer vulnerabilitiy." Consider, for example, the following
three widely accepted definitions:
1. In [BB96] Matt Bishop and Dave Bailey give the following definition of computer vulnerability:
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"A computer system is composed of states describing the current configuration of the entities
that make up the computer system. The system computes through the application of state
tmnsitions that change the state of the system. All states reachable from a given initial state
using a set of state transitions fall into the class of authorized or unauthorized, as defined by
a security policy. In this paper, the definitions of these classes and transitions is considered
axiomatic."
"A vulncmble state is an authorized state from which an Wlauthorized state can be reached
using authorized state transitions. A compromised state is the state so reached. An attack is
a sequence of authorized state transitions which end in a compromised state. By definition, an
attack begins in a vulnerable state."
"A vulnerability is a characterization of a vulnerable state which distinguishes it from all non-
vulnerable states. Ifgeneric, the vulnerability may characterize many vulnerable states; if specific,
it may characterize only one..."
2. The Data & Computer Security Dictionary of Standards, Concepts, and Terms [LS90] provides the following
deflnition of computer vulnerability:
"1) In computer security, a weakness in automated systems security procedures, administrative
controls, Internet controls, etc., that could be exploited by a threat to gain unauthorized access to
infonnation of to disrupt critical processing. 2) In computer security, a weakness in the physical
layout, organization, procedures, personnel, management, administration, hardware or software
that may be exploited to cause harm to the ADP system or activity. The presence of a vulnerability
does not itself cause harm. A vulnerability is merely a condil:;ion or set of conditions I:;hat may
allow the ADP system or activil:;y to be harmed by an attack. 3) In computer security, any
weakness or flaw existing in a system. The attack or harmful event, or the opportunity available
to a threat agent to mount that attack."
3. The Handbook of INFOSEC Terms [han96] provides the following definiton of computer vulnerabilty:
"1) A weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, internal
controls, and so forth, that could be exploited by a threat to gain unauthorized access to in-
formation or disrupt critical processing. 2) A weakness in system security procedures, hardware
design, internal controls, etc., which could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to classified or
sensitive infonnation. 3) A weakness in the physical layout, organization, procedures, personnel,
management, administration, hardware, or software that may be exploited to cause harm to the
ADP system or activity. The presence of a vulnerability does not in itself cause harm; a vulnera-
bility is merely a condition or set of conditions that may allow the ADP system or activity to be
harmed by an attack. 4) An assertion primarily concerning entities of the internal environment
(assets); we say that an asset (or class of assets) is vulnerable (in some way, possibly involving an
agent or collection of agents); we write: V(i,e) where: e may be an empty set. 5) Susceptibility
to various threats. 6) A set of properl:;ies of a specific internal entity that, in union with a set of
properties of a specific external entity, implies a risk. 7) The characteristics of a system which
cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a
result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile
environment. 8) Weakness in an information system, or cryptographic system, or components
(e.g., system security procedures, hardware design, internal controls) that could be exploited."
From all these definitions we can at least infer that a computer vulnerability is the characterization of actions
taken by a software system in violation to policy. It is unfortunate that policies are often not stated explicitly
during the development of software systems and when they are specified they are often ambiguous.
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Consider the first definition given above and it's application to a well known and documented vulnerability-
the xterm log vulnerability in UNIX systems [KS95a, KS95b, CDE+96, Bis95]. The xterm program runs as root
and is tricked into changing the ownership of an arbitrary file to that of the current user. We can model the
program execution as a three step process where the program starts execution, asks for a file name, and changes
the ownership of the file so as to give control of file to the user.
As Figure 1 shows, every filename entered by the user will cause the system to take a different path in the
state machine describing the execution of the system. The number of states in the machine are finite because
in all actual computing systems there is a limited amount of memory. In practice, however, the number of such
states will be extremely large. In this case we are worried about those states that result from the application of
the cholffi system call (in the figure S~, S~, S~, S~+l' SL S~, and S~+J)' A security policy will need to identify










Figure 1: Sample characterization of vulnerable states for
a simple version of the xterm log bug. It is not possible to
determine all possible vulnerable states without a signifi-
cant amount of semantic information.
Users familiar with the UNTX operating system would readily agree that states S~ and S~ are clear violations
of the security policy explicitly stated by the UNIX access control mechanisms; it may be argued that states S~ _
and S~+l are violations of policy because it is widely accepted that modifications to .rhost files should always
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be viewed with suspicion; whether states Sk' 5~, and S~+I are violations of policy is debatable because a fair
amount of semantic information about the content and purpose of these files must be known a-priory.
And indeed, there are many cases where the explicit definition of policy depends heavily on perspective. Take,
for example the actual case of Netscape running on a Windows 95 machine: How can a policy be specified for the
access of files by Netscape? There is no access control mechanism provided by the operating system and hence
Netscape itself must voluntarily enforce a security policy. Developers might, for example, specify that Netscape
has complete control of all files in its temporary and cache directories. In at least one machine at the COAST
Lab, however, the default for this temporary directory (as configured by the Netscape installer) is C:\DOS. From
the perspective of the developer the policy might have been sufficient. From the perspective of the user this
policy is certainly not specific enough and must be refined because this directory also contains the systems files
and should not be tampered with.
This same problem exists in other operating systems with access control mechanisms like UNIX. In these
operating systems users can tell Netscape what temporary directory to use, and the fact that a user might choose
to have all his applications run with the same temporary directory does not mean that Netscape should modify
files it has not created, regardless of what is explicitly stated by the UNIX access control mechanism.
Another example can be found with the Frame Maker application running under Solaris 2.5. The default
behavior of this application, as installed in the Computer Science department at Purdue University, is to create
a file called fmdictionaxy in the home directory of the person running the application whenever a word is added
to the user dictionary. IT there already exists such a file, Frame Maker will replace it with a new file containing
the personal dictionary of the user.
The policy for what is allowed and not allowed with this software has not been explicitly stated. It's expected
behavior, and hence the perceived policy, will be different from the point of view of the programmer (the policy is
that the user may never have a file called fmdictioDaxy in his home directory) and from the user (that may have
a file or a symbolic link called fmdictioDaxy that may have important information regarding, say, a dictionary
of FM radio stations).
In her book "Cryptography and Data Security", Dorothy Denning states that an access control policy specifies
the authorized accesses of a system and gives the following definitions of system states and policies [Den83J:
The state of a system is defined by a triple (5,0, A), where:
1. S is a set of subjects, which are the active entities of the model. Subjects are also considered to
be objects; thus S f; O.
2. 0 is a set of objects, which are the protected entities of the system. Each object is uniquely
identified with a name.
3. A is an access matrix, with rows corresponding to subjects and columns to objects. An entry
A[s, 0] lists the access rights (or privileges) of subject s over object o.
Changes to the state of a system are modeled by a set of commands, specified be a sequence of
primitive operations that change the access matrix.
A configuration of the access matrix describes what subjects can do - not necessarily what they
are authorized to do. A protection policy (or security policy) partitions the set of all possible states
into authorized versus unauthorized states.
As shown by the above examples, actual systems lack such detailed and explicit protection policies. Hence,
it is difficult to provide a precise working definition of what a vulnerability is because this depends on a precise
security policy for any system being analyzed. Also, a working definition of a vulnerability based on explicit
policies is particularly difficult in technologies such as Microsoft's ActiveX [Gar96]. Systems running ActiveX,
either as part of Microsoft's proposed Active Desktop [act96] or as part of the Microsoft Explorer WWW browser,
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dynamically download binary executables from the Internet without verifying that their execution satisfies the
policies for the system in which it will run. Microsoft argues that it's Authenticode Technology guarantees the
authenticity of software as [aut96] explains:
"Today's web sites provide not only a rich experience for users but also the possibility of unwittingly
downloading malicious code. With increasingly active content on the Internet, end users often must
decide whether or not to download code over the Internet. However, end users cannot really tell what
a piece of software will do, until tbey've downloaded to their PCs."
"Unlike the retail environment, software on the Internet is not labeled or "shrink-wrapped." There-
fore, end users don't know for sure who published a piece of software on the Internet. They also don't
know ifthe code has been tampered with. As a result, end users take on a certain amount ofrisk when
downloading, Java applets, plug-ins, AetiveX Controls, and other executables over the Internet."
"Internet Explorer 3.0 uses Authenticode technology to help address this problem for end users.
Authenticode identifies the publisher of signed software and verifies that it hasn't been tampered with,
before users download software to their PCs. As a result, end users can make a more informed decision
as to whether or not to download code."
The problem with this model is tbat developers, administrators, and users may not have the same view as to
what policies should be in effect when the binary code has been deployed. An ActiveX control that scans a hard
disk and reports its contents to a particular server, for example, may be appropriate for a user that is being aided
by a consultant but may not be appropriate for users in the military.
At this point, tbe quest for finding a precise definition of the term "computer vulnerability" that everyone
can agree on may seem hopless. There are, bowever, a subset of vulnerabilities that we may be able to clearly
identify. The vulnerabilities that result from the violation of clear access control mechanisms (such as protection
bits in UNIX) are included in this subset, and these will be used as a starting point for my dissertation.
At this point it is not clear that these are the only vulnerabilities we can identify unambiguously. Part of tbe
work left during this dissertation is to develop a precise working definition of vulnerability that will encompass a
large but manageable subset of the vulnerabilities encompassed by the definitions given in this section.
3 Related Work
Several groups have constructed vulnerability databases with various degrees of sophistication. Examples of such
databases arel : the database at the COAST Laboratory; the CMET database at the AFIW (Air-force Information
Warfare); the database maintained by Mike Neuman; the database at the University of California at Davis; the
database at CERT; the internal databases at Netscape, SUN, and NCSA; etc.
The schemas for the databases I have seen, the CMET database, the AFIW database, the COAST database,.
the database at the University of California at Davis, the CERN database, and the database maintaned by Mike
Neuman, share a common feature: they are designed for the storage of information, and not for its automatic
manipulation. They are designed to store and classify the textual information tbat is normally available in the
Internet, if at all. In any of these databases it is possible to searcb for vulnerabilities present in a particular
version of an operating system, display the patches that have been released for a particular vulnerability, an
clisplay the scripts used to exploit a vulnerability or class of vulnerabilities.
However, in none of these databases can we perform even the most basic analysis on the information stored
within. None of the databases mentioned above have enough information or an adequate representation to perform





operations such as determining if a vulnerability is present in a particular system:'!, whether finding a vulnerability
in an operating system implies that the same vtllncrability is present in another, or if the vulnerability information
in the database seems to imply that there is a direct correlation between software metrics and the existence of
vulnerabilities (correlation and cluster analysis). The ability to perform these operations is of importance in the
prevention of the exploitation of unknown (but familiar) vulnerabilities.
In [AsI95, AKS96a] Aslam and Krsu( explore the development of a classification scheme that can aid in
the understanding of software faults that can subvert security mechanisms. Their classification scheme divides
software faults into two broad categories: Coding Faults that result from errors in programming logic, missing
requirements, or design errors; and Emergent Faults resulting from improper installation or administration of
software so that faults are present even if the software is functioning according to specifications.
Several projects have dealt with the issue of identifying and classifying software faults, including the Protection
Analysis (PA) Project which conducted research on protection errors in operating systems [CBP75, BPC75]i the
RISaS project that was aimed at understanding security problems in existing operating systems and to suggest
ways to enhance their security[A+76]i the paper published by Carl Landwehr (et al.) in which he published a
collection of security flaws in different operating systems and classified each flaw according to its genesis, or the
time it was introduced into the system, or the section of code where each flaw was introduced [L+93]; and the
~;urvey published by Brian Marick of software fault studies from the software engineering literature (the studies
reported faults that were discovered in production quality software) [Mar90].
Finally, there are several products that incorporate vulnerability information for detection of their presence
in computer systems. The more widely known are the COPS security checker [FS91), SATAN, Tiger, ISS, and
the TAMU security checker.
4 Proposed Solution
In the ideal case it would be desirable to perform sophisticated computer analysis on existing vulnerability
information including, but not limited to, the detection of hidden and significant, and possibly non-obvious,
relationships in vulnerabilities; the application of correlation and clustering analysis to existing vulnerability
information to aid in the understanding of the relationships between vulnerabilities and the systems they are
found on; and the generation of software engineering tools that will find vulnerabilities on computer systems
before these arc deployed.
Data analysis tools work best when the data is well defined and when features are available. I propose to
organize vulnerability information as points or vectors in n dimensional space. The term "vulnerability database"
is so overloaded with meaning that we will speak: of a vulncmbility state space consisting of tuples of the form
< 0':, fl, 7, ... , w > where 0':, {J, 7, and w are enumerable characteristics of vulnerabilities such as cause, exploit,
locale, and result. Each fully specified tuple represents a point in an n dimensional space.
This notation allows for the explicit manipulation of data in the vulnerability state space according to mean-
ingful operators. One such operator is, for example, the projection operator. Consider, as illustrated by Figure 2,
a three dimensional state space where there the only features analyzed are 0':, {J, and 7. It should be possible to
apply a projection operator to eliminate onc of the dimensions and obtain from the state space a two dimensional
bit pattern that can be used for cluster analysis or pattern recognition. The argument generalizes to n dimensions
where projections can create hyper-planes where analysis can be performed.
There arc serveral tools and mechanisms that we might usc in the search for useful and insightful patterns in
2Determining if a vulnerability is present in a system is not the same as listing the operating systems that are known to have heen
affcctcd by the vulnerability. Determining if a vulnerability is present involves examining the system of interest and determining if
the conditions necessary for thc system to bc vulnerable arc satisfied.
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Figure 2: Detection of patterns on projections of the
database. The figure illustrates how projections of a three
dimensional state space can generate a two dimensional
grid that could be used to detect patterns using cluster
analysis.
the data of a good vulnerability !:ltate space including tools for discovery statistics, visualization, neural networks,
applied perception, and machine learning [Wat95, Hed95, kdd, HS94].
The database model that this vulnerability state space is implemented on is not of critical importance. The
COAST group, for example, has structured its database as a relational hierarchy implemented as flat text files.
Other institutions have structured theirs as relational databases administered by commercial database engines.
Others have structured their databases as simple flat files.
5 Contributions
Virtually every field where failure can be catastrophic has recognized that accumulation of information about
failures is critical to the stepwise refinement of technology, particularly when the systems that fail are highly,
complex. In "The logic of failure," Dietrich Dorner [Dor96] points out that complex systems that fail often have
four characteristics that make them specially prone to failure: complexity, intransparence3 , internal dynamics,
and incomplete or incorrect understanding of the system. Although tIlis book analyzes highly dynamic systems
such as nuclear power plants, management of entire cities or countries, etc. J we find that many of these ideas can
be applied to computer science in the search for explanations on why computer systems fail (or have vulnerabilities
that can be exploited).
3lnuansparcnce is defined as the fad that an observer of the operation of a system cannot see the inner workings of a program.
It contributes to the development of faulty software because developers tan not SfX the execution of the program without the help




Complexity is cerlJainly a factor in the appearance of vulnerabilities as has been demonstrated by a particularly
failure-prone system: sendmail. It has been argued that tILis system is so complex that the only truly intelligent
action regarding this system would be to replace it with a simpler, more manageable one. That software devel-
opment is a complex business is not a ground-breaking realization. Already in 1975 Frederick Brooks wrote in
his book The Mythical Man-Month that "Since software construction is inherently a systems effort-an exercise
in complex interrelationships-communication effort is great, and it quickly dominates the decrease in individual
task time brought about by partitioning." [Jr.9S]
In "Why Cryptosystems Fail" [And94], Ross Anderson writes the following about this topic:
"When an aircraft crashcs, it is front page news. Teams of investigators rush to the sccne, and
the subsequent enquiries arc conducted by experts from organisations with a wide range of interests -
the carrier, the insurer, the manufacturer, the airline pilots' union, and the local aviation authority.
Their findings are examined by journalists and politicians, discussed in pilots' messes, and passed on
by flying instructors. In short, the flying community has a very strong and institutionalised learning
mechanism. This is the main reason why, despite the inhcrent hazards of flying in large aircraft, which
are maintained and piloted by fallible human beings, at hundreds of miles an hour through congested
airspace, in bad weather and at night, the risk of being killed on an air journey is only about one in a
million. "
Several other sources including "When Technology Fails" [Sch94] and "Normal Accidents" [Per84] make it
clear that prompt and complete information dissemination is critical if we want to learn from past mistakes.
More often than not, it is not the designers of the systems that find and debug complex systems but observers
who find patterns that lead to the cause of failures.
Scientists and engineers that are responsible for the development of critical systems are used to the idea
of learning from past mistakes. In "Why Buildings Fall Down" [LS92], Levy and Salvadori describe in great
detail some of the more spectacular structural failures in history and provide evidence that structural failures
are likely to become less common because of the application of the knowledge gathered in the examination of
past failures to modern designs. The same argument can be made in the design of airplanes, bridges, nuelear
power plants, or any complex system where it is virtually impossible to design a corrcct system from scratch
[Pet8S, Jr.9S, Sch94, Per84, Dor96, And94]. As Confucius said: "If you wish to control the future, study the
past" [bri9S].
Accordingly, a fundamental contribution from my work will be the organization of past vulnerability data into
a state space where the classification of vulnerabilities (i.e. for each vulnerability assigning value~ to each of the
dimensions of the space) is repeatable. Given the dimensions of the space and the vulnerability information, any
person should be able to re-create the state space.
Some of the dimensions of this space will be classifications that will be self sustained, consistent, objective,
and capable of distinguishing important features that can be used to find patterns of and dependencies that might
help us better understand the nature of computer vulnerabilities.
The complexity, intransparence, and sheer volume of code in computer systems systems make it difficult to
find such patterns and dependencies. Existing data mining techniques and other feature-extracting tools widely
used in SUell areas as computer vision and pattern recognition could be used to extract information that would
allow a much better understanding of why and how vulnerabilities get introduced in computer systems.
An exmnple will illustrate the type of knowledge that cml be obtained: Assume that the vulnerability database
to be used would contain software metrics and system call counts for the systems that have known vulnerabilities.
Assume further that thc knowledge discovery tools found a high correlation between systems that have buffer
overrun vulnerabilities, systems that have high decision counts, and systems that use the gets system call.
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Software designers could then have information that could identify potential buffer overrun vulnerabilities of
their systems automatically by simply computing the necessary metrics and comparing the results with those
obtained in the example.
At this point, the example presented is complete speculation. However, those readers that have followed-up
on the discovery of computer vulnerabilities in the past few years might agree that it is not entirely unreasonable.
Even this result, however trivial it may seem at first, would be a considerable advancement in the field towards
the development of tools that will help detect vulnerabilities during the development phase of a project.
For my dissertation I will attempt to find such relationships in vulnerability data and a prerequisite for this
work is coming up with a list of features that will allow statistical analysis and data mining in the vulnerability
state space from many sources that can be used as a starting point for finding these [SCS86, Tas78, KP78, RN93L
K594, K596, OC91, Eva84, LR9Z, S5TG9Z, Tou94, OC90, Tas78]. The collection classification of vulnerabilities
using t;hese features should be an objective, reliable and repeatable process.
6 Completion Conditions
As with most scientific theories, confidence in our theory must be built by repeated observations that will validate
our predictions. The philosopher of Science Karl Popper has emphasized that a good theory makes a series of
predictions that can be proved false, or falsified, by observations. In his book Conjectures and Refutations he
states that "...every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability."
[Pop69]. As the physicist Stephen Hawking remarked: "Any physical theory is always provisional, in the sense
that it is only a hypothesis: yOll can never prove it. No matter how many times the results of experiments agree.
with some theory, you can Dever be sure that the next time the result will Dot contradict the theory. On the other
hand, you can disprove a theory by finding a single observation that disagrees with the predictions of the theory...
Each time new experiments are observed to agree with the predict;ions the theory survives, and our confidence
in it is increased; but if ever a new observation is found to disagree, we have to abandon or modify the theory."
[Haw88]
And indeed I make a significant predict;ion: Computer vulnerability information presents important regularities
and these can be detected, and possibly visualized, providing important insight about the reason of their prevalence
and existence. I expect to provide enough supporting evidence that will show the usefulness of the knowledge
acquired and techniques developed throughout the development of the dissertation.
It is conceivable, however, that during my research I may find that the result of experimentation will show
that falsity of our theory, in which case a substantial contribution to t;he field would still be made because the
prediction I have verbalized is implicitly assumed by a portion of the computer security community.
6.1 State Space Size
As stated in section 4, my work requires a collection of vulnerabilities for the state space, each wit;h as many
characteristics (also known as features or dimensions) filled in as possible from the possible set (Le. the number
of dimensions in the state space). Fully qualified features represent points in the multi-dimensional space and
partially qua1ified vulnerabilities represent hyper-planes.
How many points or hyper-planes (i.e. samples) do we need to be able to apply the proposed data analysis
tools? Without detailed knowledge of the distribution and characteristics of t;he data in question, we cannot know
a-priori the number of samples required. The machine learning community, however, can provide us with some
guidelines that will help us estimate the number of samples required for learning and classification algorithms in
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general. It is important to note that at this point in time, these guidelines set only very tentative limits to the
initial size of the state space.
In [WK91J, Weiss Kulikowsk claim that that for classifiers and learning systems, a surprisingly small number
of test cases are needed for accurate error rate estimations: at 50 test cases there is a good chance that, even
thongh the test sample eITor rate is 0%, the true error rate is as large as 10% (See Appendix A for a definition
of these errors). At 1000 samples, the true error is almost certainly below 1%. Traditionally, a small statistical
sample size is around 30 samples.
Many simplifying assumptions were made for this particular approximation, including some assumptions about
the distribution of the test cases. These are assumed to be a good representation of the true population.
Another useful insight regarding the size of the state space is the rule that learning systems need samples that
must exceed two to three times the number of features [DH73J. If we have 30 featurC".s in the state space, we must
have at least 60-90 samples.
After reviewing some of the machine learning literature [WK91, DH73, Qui8G, QCJ, llre94, FS96] we can
provide an initial estimation of the number of samples and number of features that will be needed: approximately
100·200 samples and 20-30 features.
6.2 Feature Indentification
A feature for a computer vulnerability is characteristic or metric of the vulnerability, it's exploitation, and the
software it manifests itself on. The number of possible features for a vulnerability, according to the rather limited
definition in section 2, is infinitely enumerable and one of the challenging aspects of this dissertation is the
identification of a small set of useful features for the state space.
The following is an enumeration of some of the possible features we have identified to date. At this point
there is no guarantee that any or all of these features will be lIseful for my analysis, or that we will be able to
collect them automatically and objectively.
Impact. The impact and consequences of the exploitation of the vulnerability by a threat agent.
Immediate Impact. Rather than the ultimate or eventual impact of the vulnerability (which in UNIX tends to
be root access), the first or immediate impact of the vulnerability.





Advisories. Institutions or groups that have issued an advisory about the vulnerability.
Analysis. Do we have a detailed analysis about the vulnerability?
Detection. Does a mechanism for detecting the exploitation of the vulnerability exist?
Test. Does a mechanism exist for detecting a vulnerability in a particular system?
Patch. Does a patch exist for the vulnerability?
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Exploit. Does an exploit script exist for the vulnerability?
Aslam Classification. The Aslam et a1. classification [AKS96b].
System Category. To what system component does the vulnerability belong to?
Software Metrics. A number of software metrics collected from the vulnerable systems might be useful includ-
ing:
Program Complexity.
System Call Usage. The use of several notorious system calls in programs that contain vulnerabilities.
Programming Language. Programming language used in the system that contains the vulnerability.
Access Required for Exploitation. What previous access is required for the exploitation of the vulnerability?
Ease of Exploit. HolV easy is it to exploit the vulnerability?
Origins and Causes. What are the origins and causes of the vulnerability?
7 Current State
In the past months I have been working on the development of a data set that will be used to test my theories. A
byproduct of my research is a vulnerability database that is substantially better than the previous collection of
vulnerabilities that resulted from the work done by Taimur Aslam for his masters thesis [AsI95]. As of this writing,
the database consists of several fields that can be of types text, list, or hierarchical classifier. Text fields are free .
format and can include any information. Values for list fields are limited to codes defined in a field definition file.
Similarly, values for hierarchical classifiers arc limited to codes defined in hierarchical field definition file.
The vulnerability database can be found in /homes/krsul/security/vulner. This directory must be mounted
as a Cryptographic File System[Bla93] before it can be used. Applications and tables related to the database can
be found in /homes/krsul/security/vdbase. We will refer to this directory as the $VAPP directory. Library files
including field definitions and lists and classifiers are in the $VAPP/lib directory. I will call this last directory the
$VLIB directory.
The fields acceptable in the database as well as their types arc defined in the $VLIB/field.J.ist directory.
As of this writing the list of acceptable fields allowed in the database arc:
(Identification)
Field ID Title Description Type
vid Identification Vulnerability ill or identification string Text
title Title Title of vulnerability Text
(Description and impact)
Field ID Title Description Type
desc Description Vulnerability description Text
u...impact Ultimate Impact Ultimate consequences of the exploitation H. classifier
of tbe vulnerability by a threat agent
i...impact Immediate Impact Immediate consequences of the exploita- H. classifier
tion of the vulnerability by a threat agent
impact_verbatim Impact Textual description of impact Text




Field ID Title Description Type
system System(s) System(s) vulnerable List
system_version System version System Version Text
system_vendor System vendor System vendor List
system_verbatim Misc. system Additional system information
(Application)
Field ill Title Description Type
app Application(s) Application(s) vulnerable List
app_version Application version Appli.cation Version Text
app_verbatim Misc. application Additional application information Text
(References)
Field ill Title Description Type
advisory Advisorylies Advisorylies that warnldescribe about Text
the vulnerability
reference References References to the vulnerability in litera- Text
ture or on the net
(Detailed analysis, detection techniques and fixes)
Field ID Title Description Type
analysis Analysis A detailed analysis of the vulnerability Text
detection Detection Method of detecting that the vulnerability Text
is being exploited
fix Fix A fix that can be used to eliminate the Text
vulnerability.
test Test Method/s that can be used to detect Text
whether the vulnerability is present in a
system
workaround Workaround A temporary workaround for the vulnera- Text
bility. Used until a patch can be applied.
patch Patch(es) A patch or a series of patches that can be Text
used to eliminate the vulnerability.
(Detailed information about exploitaition)
Field ill Title Description Type
exploit Exploit Scripts Reference to exploit scripts or programs Text
idiot IDIOT Pattern IDIOT Pattern used to detect the ex~ Text
ploitation of the vulnerability.
access.required Access Required Access required for the exploitation of the List
vulnerability.
eo_C).-ploit Ease of Exploit How easy is it to exploit the vulnerability? List




Field ill Title Description Type
class Classification Classification H. classifier
category System/Category To what system or component does the List
vulnerability belong to
or:igin~causes Origin and Causes Origin and causes of the vulnerability List
(Verification of vulnerability)
Field ill Title Description Type
verif Verilied by Person 0' entity that verified the Text
vulnerability
The followmg lists and hierarchical classifiers are currently defined in the vulnerability database:
Classifier: Access required
This classifier was originally defined from a talk given by Tom Longstaff [Lon97] and defines the kind of
access that is required to exploit the vulnerability.






This classifier defines the application that has the vulnerability. This classifier is relevant for those
vulnerabilities that are present in user-level programs, daemons, servers, etc. that are not a part of the
operating system istelf (kernel?)
• Netscape WWW Browser
• SUN's HotJava WWW Browser
• Java Developer Kit's appler viewer
• Oracle PowerBrowser
• CD digital audio player utility for XlI/Motif
• Network Information System
• Apache WWW httpd
• Microsoft FrontPage
• Microsoft Internet Explorer
• Netscape's News Server
Classifier: Category
This classifier attempts to identify the system component that a vulnerability belong to.
• General system software
• General system utilities
• Logging software
• Software that deals with electronic mail




This classifier defines the Aslam classification for the vulnerability. The Aslarn classification was designed
by Taimur Aslam and later refined by Ivan Krsul at the COAST laboratory [AKS96a].
• Coding Faults
• Synchronization errors
• Timing window/Race condition: A fault can be exploited because of a timing window between
two operations.
• Improper serialization: A fault results from improper serialization of operations.
• Atomicity: Did the error occur when partially-modified data structures were observed by another
process? Did the error occur because the code terminated with data only partially modified as part of
some operation that should have been atomic?
• Condition validation errors
• Boundary Condition Error
• Condition is missing
• Condition is incorrectly specified
• Predicate in condition is missing
• Access Validation Error
• Condition is missing
• Condition is incorrectly specified
• Predicate in condition is missing
• Origin Validation Error
• Condition is missing
• Condition is incorrectly specified
• Predicate in condition is missing
• Input Validation Error
• Condition is missing
• Condition is incorrectly specified
• Predicate in condition is missing
• Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions
• Condition is missing
• Condition is incorrectly specified
• Predicate in condition is missing
• Program design errors
• Program uses relative path names
• The use of relative path names to specify dynamically linked libraries.
• Failure of software to authenticate that it is really communicating with the desired software or hardware
module it wants to be accessing.
• Implicit trust: For example, routine B assumes routine A's parameters are correct because routine
A is a system process.
• Emergent Faults
• Configuration errors.
• Program/utility installed in the wrong place.
• Program/utility installed with incorrect setup parameters.
• SUID/SGID ,hell
• SUID/SGID programs written in PERL that don't usc the "taintperl" program.
• SUID/SGID routines that use the systemO, popenO, execlpO, or execvpO calls to run
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something else.
• Secondary storage object or program is installed with incorrect permissions.
• Environment faults are introduced when specifications are translated to code but sufficient attention is not
paid to the run-time environment. Environmental faults can also occur when different modules interact in
an unanticipated manner. Independently the modules may function according to specifications but an error
occurs when they are subjected to a specific set of inputs in a particular configuration environment.
Classifier: Ease of Exploit
This classifier was originally defined from a talk given by Tom Longstaff [Lon97] and attempts to identify




• Must convince a user to take an action
• Must convince an administrator to take an action
Classifier: Impact
This classifier attempts to identify the impact of the vulnerability. This classifier is used to define both
direct and indirect impacts. Direct impacts are those that are felt immediately after the vulnerability is
exploited and indirect impact are those that ultimately result from the exploitation of the vulnerability.
• Access to data
• Access to administrative or system data
• Access to user level data
• Loss of data
• System data is lost or corrupted by the exploitation of a vulnerability
• User data is lost or corrupted by the exploitation of a vulnerability
• Execution of commands
• Execution of administrative or system commands
• Generalized root access
• Internal users can obtain generalized root access
• EJI.-tcrnal users can obtain generalized root access
• Execution of specific system commands
• Internal users can execute specific system commands
• External users can execute specific system commands
• Execution of user level commands
• A software that is running in behalf of the user can execute a user level command in violation of
access controls set by administrators
• Internal users can execute user level commands in violation of access controls set by administrators
• External users can execute user level commands in violation of access controls set by administrators
• Execution of code
• Execution of machine language code with system privileges
• Internal users can execute machine language code with privileges
• External users can execute machine language code with privileges
• Execution of machine language code with user privileges
• Internal users can execute machine language code
• External users can execute machine language code
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• Execution of scripts with system privileges
• Internal users can execute scripts with privilege..:;
• External users can execute scripts with privileges
• Execution of scripts with user privileges
• Internal users can execute scripts
• External users can execute scripts
• Denial of service
• System resources are exhausted
• System resources are eliminated
Classifier: Origin and causes
This classifier was originally defined from a talk given by Tom Longstaff [Long?] and attempts to identify
the origins of the vulnerability.
• Lack of training
• Procedures not followed
• Problem re-introduced
• Bug fix not propagated
• Inconsistent specifications
• Debug code not removed
• From [Eis97]: Faulty assumption/model or misdireded blame.
Classifier: Sources
This classifier is used to identify the source of the vulnerability (i.e. where docs the information we have
comes from).
• Information posted to the Internet (Public!)
• Information posted to a newsgroup
• Information posted to a public mailing list
• Information posted to a private mailing list
• Information obtained through personal or private e-mail
• Information published in the literature
• Information exchanged
• Information from Haystack Labs.
Classifier: System




• Microsoft Windows 95




















This hierarchical classifier attempts to classify the threat that vulnerabilities create and was extracted
from "Current and Future Danger: A CSI Primer on Computer Crime & Information Warfare" by Richard
Power [Pow96j. The classification is attributed to Don Parker of SRI International as a classification of
hostile actions that your adversary could take against you.
• Threats to availability and usefulness
• Destroy, damage or contaminate
• Deny, prolong or delay use of access
• Threats to integrity and authenticity
• Enter, use of produce false data
• Modify, replace or reorder
• Misrepresent
• Repudiate
• Misuse or fail to use as required
• Threats to confidentiality and possesions
• Access
• Disclose
• Observe or monitor
• Copy
• Steal
• Exposure to threats
• Endanger by exposure to any of the other threats
Classifier: Vendor
This classifier is used to identify the vendor of the systems or that the vulnerability is present on.
• Sun Microsystems, Inc.
• Microsoft
• Sillicon Graphics Inc.
• Netscape Corporation
• Berkeley Software Design, Inc.






• The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
• NeXT Software, Inc.
• The Open Group
• The Santa Cruz Operation (SCO)
• Caldera
Classifier: Complexity of Exploit
This classifier attempts to identify the complexity of the exploitation of a vulnerability, regardless of
whether a script or toolkit exists for the exploitation of the vulnerability.
• Exploitation is a simple sequence of commands or instructions
• Exploitation requires a complex set or large number of commands or instructions.
• The exploitation requires timing and synchronization. Tipically requires a script that tries several times
and may require slowing down the system.
8 Future Work
Although I do not plan to address these issues fully in my dissertation, my work could be expanded to the design
of vulnerability databases that contain information useful for at least the following categories:
1. It is desirable to express the vulnerabilities so that tools can use these descriptions to detect the presence
of vulnerabilities in a particular system.
2. It is desirable to express the vulnerabilities so that intrusion detection patterns can be generated automat-
ically.
In the first case, it is important to discern between being able to detect vulnerabilities and being able to exploit
them. Presumably, a vulnerability database oriented towards the detection of vulnerabilities would not include
enough information to allow the exploitation of these vulnerabilities. The computer security community seems to
agree that it is difficult to reveal any information about the vulnerability without revealing enough information
that could be used to exploit it. Some have gone as far as claiming that the sole announcement of a vulnerability
is enough of a hint to allow the more sophisticated hackers to produce exploit scripts. However, in practice it
may be possible to structure the information to make the generation of exploit scripts as difficult as possible.
The generation of intrusion detection signatures or patterns, and in particular patterns for the IDIOT intrusion
detection system[KS94, KS95b, Kum95], is a difficult and time consuming task. IDIOT patterns are encodings
of vulnerabilities as Colored Petri Nets that encode the transitions that a typical vulnerability (from a class of
similar vulnerabilities) takes. Development of a pattern implies detailed working knowledge of the problem and
of the structure of the system being analyzed.
For example, [CDE+9G, I(S95a, I(S94, Kum95] all describe in detail a pattern to detect the exploitation of
a famous xterm log bug: The problem is that a user could create only one end of a named pipe and run xterm
requesting that it create a log with the same filename as the named pipe just created. Xterm would attempt to
comply and the creatO system call (attempting to create the log file) would block on the named pipe. The
exploit script would then rename the named pipe to some arbitrary value, create a symbolic link from the old
name of the pipe to the password file, and open the other end of the pipe (by eating the pipe). The creatO
system call in xterm would then succeed and the program would continue. Unfortunately, the next system call
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called by the program was a chmodO that would change the ownership of the log file (now the password file) and
because xterm. was running setuid root, the password file would be compromised.
The IDIOT pattern that detects the exploitation of this particular vulnerability, as well as others, looks for
a setuid root program that executes a creatO followed by a chmodO system call with a different file name.
Unfortunately, setuid root programs that have a valid reason to create a file and change the ownership of a
different file, in that order, would trigger the pattern and a false alarm would sound. If one wishes to reduce the
number of false positives, a more complicated pattern, perhaps, is required.
What is interesting about this particular pattern is that it will detect the e:Kploitation of any bug that shares
the same primary characteristics. Hence, it seems logical to assume that all possible vulnerabilities of this kind
require only one entry on the vulnerability database (and hence only one pattern needs to be written). In a
vulnerability as simple as this, it may be feasible to comb the existing databases to search for similar problems
that have been seen before. However, for more complex vulnerabilities this may be a time consuming and error
prone task.
What is really needed is a classification mechanism that allows us to unequivocally group similar vulnerabilities
together. In trying to address this particular issue, Taimur Aslam [AsI95] worked on a taxonomy of security fault~
in the UNIX operating system. This work includes a classification scheme, based on a binary decision tree, that
allows such grouping of vulnerabilities. Many of these classifications are rough indications of the kinds of problems
that make intrusions possible. However, they are by no means detailed enough to allow the automatic generation
of IDIOT patterns.
My dissertation could be expanded to the generation of more detailed classifications that could be used both
for the development of pattern generators and as additional dimensions to the state space providing more detailed
descriptions of vulnerabilities so feature extraction and data mining tools could be refined further.
9 Appendix A - Machine learning definitons and terminology
Test Sample Error is the perceived error rate of a classifier or learning system on the test data.
True Error is the actual error rate of a classifier or learning system when presented data it has not seen durin
the training stages.
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